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Distributions in Kind and the Dividends Paid 
Deduction-Conflict in the Circuits 
Dwight Drake* 
The dividends paid deduction provided for in section 561 of 
the Internal Revenue Code1 is of vital importance to any corpora- 
tion that is subject to the accumulated earnings tax or the per- 
sonal holding company tax.2 Either of these taxes, if applicable, 
is imposed in addition to the federal income taxes otherwise paya- 
ble by the corporation. Since the accumulated earnings tax is 
substantial3 and the personal holding company tax is downright 
confi~catory,~ a corporation must do whatever is necessary legally 
to avoid paying these additional taxes. A corporation subject to 
either of the taxes5 generally can avoid them only by taking ad- 
- - -  
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. B.S., 1970, Brigham Young 
University; J.D., 1973, University of Washington. 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to "Code" or "section(s)" are to the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
2. I.R.C. 66 531-537 govern the accumulated earnings tax. The personal holding 
company tax is governed by I.R.C. 66 541-547. Other sections directly affected by the 
dividends paid deduction include I.R.C. 6 556(a) (foreign personal holding companies), 
I.R.C. 6 852(a)(1) (regulated investment companies), and I.R.C. 6 857(a)(1) (real estate 
investment trusts). This article discusses the dividends paid deduction only in the context 
of the accumulated earnings tax and the personal holding company tax, both of which 
have a much broader application than the taxes on foreign personal holding companies, 
regulated investment companies, or real estate investment trusts. 
3. The accumulated earnings tax is levied a t  a rate of 27.5% of the first $100,000 of 
"accumulated taxable income" and 38.5% of any "accumulated taxable income" in excess 
of $100,000. I.R.C. 6 531. 
4. If a corporation is determined to be a personal holding company, a 70% tax is 
imposed on its "undistributed personal holding company income." I.R.C. 6 541. 
5. With the exception of personal holding companies, foreign personal holding com- 
panies, and Subchapter F tax-exempt corporations, the accumulated earnings tax is im- 
posed on "every corporation . . . formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding income 
tax with respect to its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation, by 
permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." 
I.R.C. 8 532. This forbidden purpose is determined to exist if the corporation accumulates 
income beyond the "reasonable needs of the business." I.R.C. 9 533(a). For a discussion 
of the term "reasonable needs of the business," see Treas. Reg. 6 1.537-1, T.D. 7165, 1972- 
1 C.B. 167; Treas. Reg. 66 1.537-2 to -3 (1959); B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS A D SHAREHOLDERS 77 8.02-07 (3d ed. 1971); and 1975 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 812. The accumulated earnings credit provided for in I.R.C. §535(c) has the effect 
of requiring that accumulated earnings exceed $150,000 before any tax is imposed. See 
note 6 infm. 
Every corporation found to be a personal holding company is subject to the personal 
holding company tax. A personal holding company generally is any corporation (1) that 
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vantage of the dividends paid deduction, which directly reduces 
the income subject to the taxes? 
Section 561 provides that the dividends paid deduction is the 
sum of the dividends paid during the year, the consent dividends 
for the year, and, in the case of personal holding companies, 
certain dividend carryovers.' This provision is supplemented by 
Treasury Regulation 1.562-1, which provides that if a dividend is 
paid in property other than cash, the dividends paid deduction 
shall equal the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the 
corporation .8 
This regulation has significant consequences for the corpora- 
tion that must distribute sufficient cash or property to avoid the 
accumulated earnings tax or the personal holding company tax 
and yet desires to minimize the resulting tax to its shareholders. 
For example, under the regulation, a personal holding company 
that must distribute $100,000 to avoid the seventy-percent tax 
has "personal holding company income" (primarily dividends, interest, rents, and other 
passive investment income, plus personal service income in the case of "incorporated 
talents") equal to at least 50% of its "adjusted ordinary gross income," (2) of which over 
50% of the value of outstanding stock is owned, directly or indirectly, by five or fewer 
shareholders. I.R.C. $0 542-543. 
6. In computing "accumulated taxable income" for purposes of the accumulated 
earnings tax, taxable income for the given year is adjusted to more accurately reflect the 
corporation's net economic gain for the year. See I.R.C. 4 535(b). In addition to this 
adjustment, an accumulated earnings credit of $150,000 (or more if the reasonable needs 
of the business exceed $150,000) and the dividends paid deduction are subtracted to arrive 
at "accumulated taxable income" on which the accumulated earnings tax is imposed. 
I.R.C. § 535(a). 
In the case of a personal holding company, taxable income is modified by adjustments 
similar to those made for the accumulated earnings tax. See I.R.C. § 545(b). From this 
amount, the dividends paid deduction is subtracted to arrive a t  "undistributed personal 
holding company income" on which the personal holding company tax is imposed. I.R.C. 
P 545(a). 
7. The consent dividends procedure, outlined in I.R.C. 8 565, allows a shareholder to 
agree with the corporation that a certain portion of the earnings and profits will be deemed 
to have been distributed as a dividend even though no distribution to the shareholder is 
actually made. The dividend is calculated as though a distribution in money had been 
made and then returned to the corporation in the form of a contribution of capital. For a 
further discussion of the consent dividend procedure, see text accompanying notes 78-79 
infra. 
A dividend carryover is allowed by I.R.C. 9 564 in establishing the dividends paid 
deduction of a personal holding company. This procedure generally permits the corporate 
taxpayer to include as part of the dividends paid the excess of the dividends distributed 
during the two prior taxable years over the corporation's taxable income as determined 
in accordance with I.R.C. O 545 adjustments. 
8. Treas. Reg. $ 1.562-l(a), T.D. 6949, 1968-1 C.B. 107: "If a dividend is paid in 
property (other than money) the amount of the dividends paid deduction with respect to 
such property shall be the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the distributing 
corporation at the time of the distribution." 
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would be required to distribute property with a tax basis of 
$100,000. If the fair market value of the property were less than 
$100,000, the corporation could deduct $100,000 while the share- 
holders would report less than $100,000 as dividend income under 
section 301-a highly desirable result.' Conversely, if the property 
had appreciated in value, the shareholders' dividend income 
could exceed the deduction-a disastrous result.1° Thus, the ef- 
fect of the regulation is to encourage distributions of depreciated 
property and to discourage distributions of appreciated property. 
Although the validity of this regulation has been questioned 
by certain commentators for some time," the regulation was not 
officially challenged until 1971. In that year, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee in H. Wetter 
Manufacturing Co. v. United Statesi2 upheld the regulation but 
was reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.13 In reversing 
the lower court, the Sixth Circuit determined that sections 301, 
316, and 562 of the Code are unambiguous in specifying that the 
deduction equals the fair market value of the property distrib- 
uted. In response to Wetter, the National Office of the Internal 
Revenue Service added the issue of the validity of the regulation 
to its Prime Issue List, thereby announcing that the Service 
would not settle the issue in a contested proceeding.14 The issue 
was next considered in Gulf Inland Corp. v. United States,l5 
wherein the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Lousiana invalidated the regulation by summarily concluding 
that the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Wetter was "well reasoned and 
9. Under I.R.C. 9 301(b)(l)(A) and (c), the taxable dividend reportable by a noncor- 
porate distributee equals the fair market value of the property distributed to the extent 
of the corporation's accumulated earnings and profits or current year's earnings and 
profits, as specified in I.R.C. 9 316. Thus, if the adjusted tax basis of the property exceeds 
its fair market value, the dividends paid deduction under the regulation would exceed the 
dividends taxable to the shareholder. The same desirable result would be achieved in the 
case of a corporate distributee, since I.R.C. § 301(b)(l)(B) specifies that a corporate 
distributee is taxed on the lesser of (1) the fair market value of the property distributed 
or (2) its adjusted tax basis plus certain gains recognized by the distributing corporation. 
10. This assumes that the shareholders are not corporations and that the corporation 
has sufficient earnings and profits under I.R.C. 9 316 to tax the shareholders to the full 
extent of the property distributed. For an explanation of the result when the earnings and 
profits are less than the fair market value of the property distributed, see notes 88-89 and 
accompanying text infra. 
11. See, e.g., 2 J. &KIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION 
9 17.11(3), at 1765-67 (1976). 
12. 330 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), reu'd, 458 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1972). 
13. 458 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1972). 
14. 119771 1 Fed. Tax Guide (CCH) fl 39B. 
15. 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-5511 (W.D. La. 1975). 
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clear." The issue was considered a third time in the recent case 
of Fulman u. United States. l6 In Fulman, the United States Dis- 
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts and the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and upheld the 
regulation. To date, no other reported cases have decided the 
issue. 
This article analyzes the issue of whether the dividends paid 
deduction should equal the adjusted tax basis of property distrib- 
uted in kind, as required by regulation 1.562-1, or the amount of 
dividend income taxable to the shareholder as a result of the 
distribution. The conclusion of this article is that the deduction 
should equal the dividend income taxable to the shareholder. 
Whereas Treasury regulations generally are entitled to deference 
when judicially reviewed, l7 a court could justifiably conclude that 
regulation 1.562-1 is invalid because it does not focus on the 
objective of the personal holding company tax and the accumu- 
lated earnings tax and is not supported by the statutory scheme 
of the Code. Therefore, the regulation should be changed or inval- 
idated and, if necessary, the Code should be amended to remove 
any remaining ambiguity. 
A. Wetter 
The first court to consider the validity of the regulation was 
the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee in H. 
Wetter Manufacturing Co. v. United States. The court held that 
16. 407 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1976). 
17. In the language of the Fulman court: 
In considering appellants' attack on this regulation, we begin by observing 
that Treasury regulations are entitled to deference. "As 'contemporaneous con- 
structions [of the Internal Revenue Code] by those charged with administra- 
tion of [it], the Regulations 'must be sustained unless unreasonable and 
plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes,' and should not be overruled 
except for weighty reasons." 
545 F.2d at 269. Although this view appears to be well settled in the law, certain notewor- 
thy qualifications have been perceived by other tribunals. As the Third Circuit has noted, 
"Treasury Regulations must be interpreted in the context of the statute they are designed 
to explicate; 'there is no power to amend [a statute] by regulation."' Bank of New York 
v. United States, 526 F.2d 1012, 1018 (3d Cir. 1975) (quoting Koshland v. Helvering, 298 
US.  441, 447 (1936)). And as a Texas district court confirmed, a regulation may be 
declared invalid whenever it "adds restrictions that are not contained in the statute it 
interprets. . . . It is clear that taxes cannot be exacted by regulation; only the statute 
can do that." Baker v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 1143,1151 (W.D. Tex. 1975) (citations 
omitted). Thus, while a Treasury regulation warrants deference, it should not be held 
sacred, particularly in those cases where it adds restrictions not contained in the statutes. 
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the regulation was valid, basing its decision on a determination 
that Congress "intended to incorporate" section 27(d) of the In- 
ternal Revenue Code of 1939 into the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954.18 Section 27(d) of the 1939 Code had expressly resolved the 
issue presented in Wetter by providing that the dividends paid 
deduction equaled the adjusted tax basis or the fair market value 
of the property distributed, whichever was lower.lg 
The Tennessee district court's determination that Congress 
intended to incorporate section 27(d) into the 1954 Code was not 
based upon any language appearing in the 1954 Code. Indeed, 
nothing in the 1954 Code suggests the result previously obtained 
under section 27(d) of the 1939 Code.2o Rather, the district court 
in Wetter based its determination exclusively upon the Senate 
Finance Report on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. That re- 
port states that the "requirements of sections 27 (d), (e), (f), and 
(i)" of the 1939 Code are "contained" in the definition of 
"dividend" in section 312 of the 1954 Code.21 On the basis of this 
statement, the district court upheld the regulation by reasoning 
that its validity "should be resolved by Congressional intent 
rather than by oversight. "22 
In reversing the district court in Wetter, the Sixth Circuit 
refused to consider the legislative history that formed the basis 
for the lower court's decision and held the regulation invalid. 
According to the Sixth Circuit, the 1954 Code unambiguously 
provides that the deduction equals the fair market value of the 
property distributed and, therefore, the plain meaning rule of 
statutory construction requires that the statute be given effect 
18. 330 F. Supp. at 446. The Tennessee district court also concluded that Congress 
intended to incorporate sections 27(e), (f), and (i) of the 1939 Code into the 1954 Code. 
Id. For a discussion of each of these sections, see notes 61-66 and accompanying text infra. 
19. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 27(d), 53 Stat. 1: 
(d) DNIDENDS IN KIND-If a dividend is paid in property other than money 
(including stock of the corporation if held by the corporation as an investment) 
the amount with respect thereto which shall be used in computing the basic 
surtax credit shall be the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the 
corporation at the time of the payment, or the fair market value of the property 
a t  the time of the payment, whichever is the lower. 
20. The only possibly relevant section of the Code that uses a formula similar to that 
set forth in section 27(d) of the 1939 Code is I.R.C. § 301(b)(l)(B), which describes the 
amount that a corporate distributee receives when a corporation makes a distribution in 
kind. For a discussion of this section, see note 40 and accompanying text infra. 
21. S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 325, reprinted in [I9541 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& AD. NEWS 4721,4965-66. For the applicable portion of this report, see text accompanying 
note 50 infra. 
22. 330 F. Supp. at 446. 
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according to its literal language and makes it "unnecessary and 
improper" to resort to legislative history or other extrinsic aids.23 
The Sixth Circuit's determination that the 1954 Code is un- 
ambiguous is based upon its analysis of the interrelationship of 
various sections of the Code, including sections 561,562,316, and 
301(d)(l). The court's entire analysis of these sections was as 
follows: 
Section 562 provides that ". . . the term 'dividend' shall, except 
as otherwise provided in this section, include only dividends 
described in section 316. . . ." Section 316 provides that if the 
distributing corporation is a personal holding company during 
the year in which the distribution is made, ". . . the term 
'dividend' also means any distribution of property . . . made by 
the corporation to its shareholders, to the extent of its undis- 
tributed personal holding company income . . . for such year." 
In addition, Section 301(d)(l) provides in the event that the 
recipient of the dividend is not a corporation, the basis of the 
property so distributed shall be "the fair market value" of the 
pr~perty.~" 
The court's brief discussion of why these sections are not am- 
biguous is itself unclear, and it proved unpersuasive to the Mas- 
sachusetts district court and the First Circuit in Fulman v. 
United States. 25 
B. Fulman 
In Fulman, the Massachusetts district court, while agreeing 
that a court may not enforce a regulation that is plainly inconsis- 
tent with the statute it purports to interpret, rejected the Sixth 
Circuit's contention that the plain meaning rule should be ap- 
plied to resolve the issue p re~en ted .~~  In finding that the 1954 
Code is ambiguous, the district court in Fulman pointed to the 
fact that section 301(d), the principal section relied upon by the 
Sixth Circuit in Wetter, "speaks only of the valuation of a corpo- 
Like other extrinsic aids to construction, the use of legislative history is to solve 
but not to create an ambiguity. . . . The ambiguity in this case is between the 
Code and the Regulations, and in such a case it  is well settled that the provisions 
of the Code are controlling. Where the provisions of an act are unambiguous, 
and its direction specific, the Secretary of the Treasury has no power to amend 
the statute by regulations. 
(citation omitted)(emphasis in original). 
24. 458 F.2d at  1034. 
25. 407 F. Supp. 1039, 1040 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 268, 270 (1st Cir. 1976). 
26. 407 F. Supp. a t  1040. 
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rate dividend received by a shareholder-distributee" and "does 
not by its terms purport to govern the effect of the distribution 
on the corporate-distributor of property distributed as a divi- 
dend."27 The court proceeded to uphold the regulation, conclud- 
ing that i t  was consistent with the congressional purpose that was 
"explicitly revealed" in the legislative history of the 1954 Code." 
The legislative history, which in the court's view "explicitly re- 
vealed" Congress' intentions, was the same legislative history 
that formed the basis of the lower court's opinion in Wetter. 
On appeal, the F i n t  Circuit upheld the r e g ~ l a t i o n , ~ ~  agreeing 
with the lower court that the statute was ambiguous.30 The court 
noted further that legislative history indicated that Congress did 
not intend to abrogate section 27(d) of the 1939 Code, which, 
according to the First Circuit, was substantially incorporated in 
the r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  Unlike the other three courts, the First Circuit 
in Fulman extended its analysis by questioning whether the regu- 
lation was consistent with the purposes of the personal holding 
company tax. The court concluded that "ultimately" the "most 
persuasive" consideration favoring the regulation was that the 
purposes of the personal holding company tax would be under- 
mined and irrational results would follow if the dividends paid 
deduction were to equal the fair market value of the property 
d i s t r i b ~ t e d . ~ ~  
27. Id. a t  1041. 
28. 407 F. Supp. at 1043: 
Even if the personal holding company tax, 26 U.S.C. § 541 et. seq., is a penalty, 
and therefore to be construed narrowly against defendant, where the Congres- 
sional purpose is explicitly revealed in the legislative history, the Treasury Reg- 
ulation is consistent with that purpose, and there is no statutory language that 
supports the construction urged by the taxpayer, the court will accord full 
weight to the regulation. 
(citation and footnote omitted). 
29. 545 F.2d at 269. 
30. Id. at 271. 
31. Id. a t  270. In fact, the regulation differs from § 27(d) of the 1939 Code in that 
the regulation provides that the deduction equals the adjusted basis of the property 
distributed whereas 6 27(d) stated that the deduction equaled the lesser of the fair market 
value and the adjusted tax basis of the property distributed. 
32. The First Circuit described the purpose of the personal holding company tax as 
follows: 
The personal holding company tax, as we have noted, was enacted to combat 
the tax avoidance that could result from the accumulation of income from 
passive investment activity in a closely held corporation. It operates to force 
both the distribution of such earnings and the realization of dividend income 
at the shareholder level by imposing a penalty tax on the undistributed income 
which had been realized by such corporations during given tax years. 
545 F.2d at 272 (emphasis in original). 
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The First Circuit gave two illustrations of how it believed the 
purposes of the personal holding company tax would be frustrated 
if the deduction were based on the fair market value of the prop- 
erty distributed. First, the court explained that if the deduction 
were to equal the fair market value of the property distributed 
and a corporation were to distribute appreciated property, the 
corporation could secure a sufficient deduction to avoid the per- 
sonal holding company tax without actually having to distribute 
the earnings that it realized during the year. Such a result, ac- 
cording to the court, would be "contrary to the clear intent" of 
the personal holding company  provision^.^^ Second, the court ex- 
plained that if the dividends paid deduction were to equal the fair 
market value of the property distributed, a personal holding com- 
pany whose investments had appreciated in value could avoid the 
personal holding company tax by distributing assets representing 
a lower level of corporate investment than could a personal hold- 
ing company that had identical earnings and amounts invested 
but whose assets had not appreciated a t  the same rate. Such a 
result, according to the First Circuit, would be "impossible to 
square with the structure and operation" of the personal holding 
company tax.34 
In order to determine whether any of the four courts properly 
examined the issue presented, it is necessary to examine in detail 
the applicable Code sections, legislative history, and policy con- 
siderations. 
The 1954 Code does not contain a provision which, by its 
express terms, states the amount of the dividends paid deduction 
when a corporation distributes property in kind to its sharehold- 
ers. Nevertheless, an examination of the interrelationship of var- 
ious sections of the 1954 Code may provide the answer. This is 
not to suggest, however, that the 1954 Code is sufficiently unam- 
biguous to justify invoking the plain meaning rule of statutory 
construction. 
The plain meaning rule essentially provides that legislative 
history and other extrinsic aids should not be used to construe a 
statute when the literal language of the statute is clear and unam- 
33. 545 F.2d at 272. For an examination and critique of the court's analysis of this 
point, see text accompanying notes 82-83 infra. 
34. 545 F.2d at 272. For an examination and critique of the court's analysis of this 
point, see text accompanying notes 84-86 infra. 
451 DIVIDENDS PAID DEDUCTION 53 
b i g u o ~ s . ~ ~  The following examination of the applicable Code sec- 
tions demonstrates that the 1954 Code is sufficiently ambiguous 
that the rule cannot reasonably be applied to resolve the contro- 
versies surrounding the dividends paid deduction. 
Section 545(a) of the Code provides that a personal holding 
company is entitled to the dividends paid deduction defined in 
section 561 in computing its personal holding company tax?" 
Similarly, section 535(a) provides that the accumulated earnings 
tax shall be computed only after adjusted taxable income is re- 
duced by the dividends paid deduction defined in section 561?' 
Section 561, in turn, provides that the corporation is entitled to 
a deduction for "dividends paid during the year" and states that 
the rules set forth in section 562 will determine the amount of the 
deduction for dividends paid.38 Following the trail, one learns 
from the pertinent part of section 562 that "the term 'dividend' 
shall . . . include only dividends described in section 316." Sec- 
tion 316 provides that a dividend is "any distribution of property 
made by a corporation to its shareholders" to the extent of its 
post-1913 earnings and profits, its earnings and profits for the 
current tax year and, in the case of personal holding companies, 
"its undistributed personal holding company income . . . for 
such year."3g 
35. See, e.g., United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 82-84 
(1932); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 94-96 (1820); Commissioner 
v. Bilder, 289 F.2d 291, 297-98 (3d Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 499 (1962). 
Proponents of the plain meaning rule contend that the rule prevents courts from usurping 
legislative authority, keeps courts out of political controversy, and precludes courts from 
relying too heavily on historical data that often is not available to the public and some 
members of the bar. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,395- 
97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory 
Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 , 3  (1965). Critics, on the other hand, contend that the 
rule is often applied arbitrarily and unreasonably to avoid a distasteful result. See, e.g., 
Lyman, The Absurdity and Repugnancy of the Plain Meaning Rule of Interpretation, 3 
MANITOBA L.J., 1969, at 53; Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" 
and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 
(1975); Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1940); 
51 TEX. L. REV. 368 (1973). 
36. The amount of the dividends paid deduction is subtracted from the adjusted 
taxable income in arriving a t  the "undistributed personal holding company income." The 
70% tax rate is applied against the undistributed personal holding company income. 
I.R.C. 9 4  541, 545. 
37. The amount of the dividends paid deduction is subtracted from the adjusted 
taxable income for the year in arriving a t  the "accumulated taxable income" for the year. 
The tax rates are applied against the accumulated taxable income. I.R.C. 99 531, 535. 
38. Section 561 also provides that a deduction shall be allowed for consent dividends 
and, in the case of personal holding companies, certain dividend carryovers. Cf. note 7 
supra (consent dividends and dividend carryovers explained). 
39. Section 316(b)(2)(A), which provides that distributions by personal holding com- 
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The statutory trail up to this point is easily followed. It is of 
little help, however, in solving the problem presented, since none 
of the sections in the trail even remotely suggest the amount of 
the deduction when property is distributed in kind. But does the 
trail stop with section 316? That question has split the circuits, 
and a careful analysis of the Code suggests that there are at least 
three possible answers. 
A. The Section 301 Alternative 
First, an argument can be made that the statutory trail goes 
one step further, and that the additional step establishes that 
regulation 1.562-1 is invalid. The basic premise of this argument 
is that when a distribution is made, the rules of sections 301 and 
316 must be read together in determining the amount of the divi- 
dend under section 316. Section 301 is significant because subsec- 
tion (b) of that section expressly provides that the amount of a 
distribution of property by a corporation to its shareholder is, in 
the case of a noncorporate distributee, the fair market value of 
the property.40 
-- -- - 
panies shall be dividends "to the extent of [the corporation's] undistributed personal 
holding company income" for the year notwithstanding an absence of earnings and profits, 
was added to the 1939 Code in 1942. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, 8 186,56 Stat. 798. Its 
specific purpose was to aid those personal holding companies that had undistributed 
personal holding company income in a particular year but had no earnings and profits. 
As stated in the House Report to the Revenue Act of 1942, without such a provision, such 
a company "is subject to the personal holding company tax and cannot avoid such tax 
by making distributions to its shareholders." H.R. REP. NO. 2333, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
136 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 473; see B. B ~ K E R  & J. EVSTICE, supra note 5, 
7 8.25 n.102. 
In its opinion in Fulman, the First Circuit described 9 316(b) as follows: 
Section 316(b) suggests that, as to distributions in property by personal holding 
companies, the term "undistributed personal holding company income" may be 
substituted for "earnings and profits" wherever the latter appears in the Code. 
If § 316(b) were conceived as having this implication, 4 312 would announce the 
rule contained in the regulation. 
545 F.2d at 271 n.6. 
The legislative history of O 316(b), as described above, demonstrates that it was never 
intended to have such broad implications. Its limited purpose is to enable corporations 
that have no earnings and profits to create a tax a t  the shareholder level and thereby avoid 
the personal holding company tax. 
40. In the case of a corporate distributee, section 301(b)(l)(B) provides that the 
amount of the distribution is the lesser of (1) the fair market value of the property, and 
(2) the adjusted tax basis of the property plus certain gains recognized by the distributing 
corporation. In applying the formula to determine the amount distributed to a corporate 
distributee, the adjusted tax basis of the property is increased by the amount of gain 
recognized by the distributing corporation under subsections (b), (c), or (d) of 9 311 
(concerning distributions of inventories and encumbered property and certain redemp- 
tions); under § 341(f) (concerning gains recognized by consenting collapsible 
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This argument is supported by the express reference to sec- 
tion 301 contained in section 316. In order for section 316 to apply, 
there must be a "distribution of property." In that connection, 
section 316 states that any distribution to which section 301 ap- 
plies shall be a distribution under 316." Similarly, section 301 (c), 
which defines the amount of distributed property that is taxable 
as a dividend, incorporates by reference the definition of divid- 
end in section 316. This cross-referencing is reflective of an im- 
portant relationship between these two sections. The definition 
of a dividend under section 316 provides the standard for dis- 
tinguishing a dividend from a return of capital when a nonliqui- 
dating distribution of property is made with respect to stock. 
Section 301, in turn, explains the differences in tax effect of a 
dividend and a return of capital. Thus, the meaning of the term 
"dividend" cannot be fully understood unless the two sections are 
read jointly. 
The regulations to section 316 further support this argument 
by adopting the principle that sections 301 and 316 should be read 
together in determining the amount of a dividend under section 
316 when a distribution of property in kind is made. Regulation 
1.316-1(a) (3) illustrates that when a corporation with earnings 
and profits of $10,000 distributes property having a fair market 
value of $16,000 and a tax basis of $3,000 to noncorporate share- 
holders, the amount of the dividend under section 316 is $10,000. 
This amount represents the lesser of the earnings and profits 
(under section 316) and the fair market value of the property 
distributed (under section 301)." Thus, the corporation's ad- 
justed tax basis in the property is irrelevant in determining the 
amount of the dividend, even though section 312 provides that 
the corporation's earnings and profits are reduced only by the 
corporation's adjusted tax basis in the property. 
corporations); under § 617(d)(l) (concerning recapture of exploration expenditures); 
under §§ 1245(a), 1250(a), 1251(c), 1252(a) (concerning recapture of depreciation and 
conservation and clearing expenditures); and under § 1254(a) (concerning recapture of 
drilling and development costs). 
41. This reference to § 301 insures that § 316, like § 301, will be applied to any 
distribution made "with respect to stock." A distribution "with respect to s tock  is any 
distribution made to a shareholder in his capacity as a shareholder. See Treas. Reg. § 
1.301-l(c) (1955). Neither section is applicable to a distribution made to a shareholder in 
another capacity-such as creditor or employee-unless the distribution in substance 
constitutes a disguised dividend. See B. B ~ E R  & J. E u s n c ~ ,  supra note 5, 7 7.05. 
note 5, 7 7.05. 
42. This regulation resolves an issue that has been heatedly debated in the past and 
arguably is not resolved by the 1954 Code. For an excellent discussion of the issue, see B. 
B ~ K E R  & J. EUSTICE, supra note 5, 7 7.22. 
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Those who argue against relying upon section 301 to deter- 
mine the amount of the dividends paid deduction point out that 
that section deals only with tax consequences to the shareholder, 
not the distributing corporation. It is critical to remember, 
however, that the term "dividend" has significance principally 
for the shareholder, not the c~rporat ion.~~ Thus, the presence of 
the term "dividend" in the phrase "dividends paid deduction" 
leads one to assume the shareholder's point of view, i.e., to value 
the dividends paid deduction by the same measure used by the 
shareholder in determining the amount of the taxable dividends 
he has received. This measure, of course, is provided by section 
301. 
B. The Section 312 Alternative 
As an alternative, it can be argued that section 312, not 
section 301, should be looked to for the answer. Section 312 
provides that a corporation's earnings and profits are reduced by 
the adjusted tax basis of property distributed to its sharehold- 
e r ~ . ~ ~  In contending that regulation 1.562-1 is valid, the govern- 
ment has relied upon the argument that section 312's reference 
to the adjusted tax basis of property distributed supports the 
regulation 
Proponents of this argument point to the fact that while 
section 301 deals only with the effect of a property distribution 
on the shareholder, section 312 specifically deals with the effect 
of the distribution on the corporation. Accordingly, one could 
conclude, as did the First Circuit in Fulman, that section 312 is 
more "relevant" than section 301, since the personal holding com- 
pany tax and the accumulated earnings tax are imposed upon the 
distributing corporation, not the  shareholder^.^' 
- 
43. Dividends received by a shareholder are generally taxed as ordinary income, while 
a return of capital frequently escapes taxation altogether. On the other hand, nonliqui- 
dating distributions in kind made by a corporation with respect to its stock are governed 
by fi 311 and 8 312; the tax consequences are the same whether the distribution is a 
dividend or not. 
44. This is the general rule. Section 312 contains specific provisions dealing with, 
among other things, inventories, encumbered property, depreciable property, certain dis- 
tributions of stock and securities, and antitrust stock. 
45. See Fulman v. United States, 545 F.2d at 271 n.6; Fulman v. United States, 407 
F. Supp. at 1041 n.5. 
46. 545 F.2d at 272: 
Although § 301 is one of the few places in the Code where the phrase "amount 
distributed" appears, we can see no reason to treat it as establishing the rules 
for determining the amount of a personal holding company's dividends paid 
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This argument is suspect because the deduction is for 
"dividends paid." The term "dividends" signals the reader from 
section 316 to section 301, as explained above, and is crucial in 
determining the tax effect of a distribution on the shareholder. 
Whether a distribution constitutes a "dividend" does not effect 
the application of section 312; the tax effects on a corporation of 
any distributions governed by section 312 (together with section 
311) are the same whether the distribution is a dividend or a 
return of capitaled7 Section 312 speaks only in terms of the corpo- 
ration's earnings and profits and appears to have nothing to do 
with the dividends paid deduction provided for in sections 561 
and 562. Nothing in the Code explicitly or impliedly links section 
312 to these provisions. For this reason, the district court in 
Fulman concluded that section 312 does not in any way establish 
a "yardstick of valuation for determining the amount of divi- 
dends paid deduct i~n ."~~ 
C. A Final Alternative 
It can be argued that the statutory trail stops a t  section 316, 
and that neither section 301 nor section 312 is helpful or 
determinative in resolving the issue. This agument results in the 
conclusion that the Code is so ambiguous that the issue must 
have been overlooked when the 1954 Code was drafted. 
Given the scope of these alternatives and the support that 
can be mustered for each, it is difficult to see how the plain 
meaning rule can be relied upon in resolving the issue. The Sixth 
Circuit in Wetter felt that the link between sections 301 and 316 
was sufficiently clear and unambiguous to justify application of 
the rule, but the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the sectionsd9 is so 
cursory as to be of little or no comfort to anyone relying upon the 
deduction. It, of course, deals only with the effect of a distribution on the 
recipients, and is thus less relevant than O 312. 
For a discussion of why the personal holding company and accumulated earnings taxes 
were imposed on the corporation instead of the shareholders, see notes 67-77 and accompa- 
nying text infra. 
47. Section 311 describes the gain or loss recognized by the corporation on the distri- 
bution; 9 312 describes the effect of the distribution on the corporation's earnings and 
profits. 
48. 407 F. Supp. at 1041. 
49. For the Sixth Circuit's entire analysis of the Code sections, see text accompanying 
note 24 supra. 
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court's opinion. Even though the plain meaning rule should not 
be applied, it does not necessarily follow that the ultimate result 
of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Wetter is wrong. Although the 
Code is not free of ambiguity, one can conclude from reading the 
Code that sections 301 and 316 should be read together in deter- 
mining the amount of the dividends paid deduction under section 
562. In addition, as explained below, the legislative history can 
be reconciled with this interpretation, and the purposes and poli- 
cies of the personal holding company tax and the accumulated 
earnings tax are best served by this result. 
In commenting upon section 562 of the 1954 Code, the Senate 
Finance Committee Report on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
states: 
Subsection (a) provides that the term "dividend" for pur- 
poses of this part shall include, except as otherwise provided in 
this section, only those dividends described in section 316 (relat- 
ing to definition of dividends for purposes of corporate distribu- 
tions). The requirements of sections 27 (d), (e), (f), and (i) of 
existing law are contained in the definition of "dividend" in 
section 312, and accordingly are not restated in section 562.50 
As previously noted, the significance of this statement is that 
section 27(d) of the 1939 Code expressly provided that the divi- 
dends paid deduction equaled the lesser of the fair market value 
or the adjusted tax basis of the property d i~ t r ibu ted .~~ 
On the basis of this statement in the Senate Finance Com- 
mittee report, the district court in Wetter and the district court 
and the First Circuit in Fulman concluded that Congress in- 
tended that former section 27(d) be incorporated in the 1954 Code 
and, therefore, that regulation 1.562-1 is valid because it "sub- 
stantially reflects" the rule set forth by the old section 27(d). In 
fact, the regulation differs from former section 27(d) in that the 
regulation provides that the deduction equals the adjusted basis 
of the property distributed, whereas section 27(d) stated that the 
deduction equaled the lesser of the fair market value or the ad- 
justed tax basis of the property distributed. Moreover, the gov- 
ernment has relied upon the statement from the Senate report in 
50. S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 325, reprinted in [I9541 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& AD. NEWS 4621, 4965-66. 
51. Note 19 supra. 
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arguing for the regulation, contending that the reference to sec- 
tion 312 in the statement indicates that the dividends paid de- 
duction should be determined according to the rule for deductions 
from earnings and profits that is set forth in section 312 of the 
1954 Code.52 
The reliance that has been placed upon the statement from 
the Senate Finance Committee report is disturbing for two rea- 
sons. First, the statement's reference to section 312 is inaccurate. 
Section 312 does not define the term "dividends," but merely 
states the effect that a distribution of property has on a corpora- 
tion's earnings and profits. The rule provided in section 312 is 
applicable whether or not the distribution constitutes a divi- 
dend." Section 316, not section 312, defines the term "divi- 
dends." Second, if one concludes, as did the three courts men- 
tioned previously, that the statement demonstrates that Con- 
gress intended to incorporate the rules of old sections 27(d), (e), 
(f), and (i) into the 1954 Code, then one must conclude that an 
enor was made in drafting the 1954 Code and that the issue was 
overlooked. 
In view of these inaccuracies, it can be argued that the Com- 
mittee's statement does not clarify the ambiguity in the Code 
sections but merely creates additional confusion. However, a 
closer look at  the statement and other legislative history of the 
1954 Code suggests that rather than revealing a blunder on the 
part of those drafting the 1954 Code, the statement identifies the 
sections of the 1954 Code that should be considered in determin- 
ing the amount of the dividends paid deduction. 
A. The Senate Report's Inaccurate Reference to Section 312 
The statement's purportedly inaccurate reference to the defi- 
nition of "dividend" in section 312 is easily explained. The state- 
ment consists of two sentences, the first correctly stating that the 
term "dividend" is described in section 316, and the second incor- 
rectly stating that the term "dividend" is defined in section 312. 
The Report of the House Ways and Means Committee on the 1954 
Code, which was prepared prior to the Senate report, contains the 
same back-to-back sentences as the Senate report, except that 
the reference in both sentences is to section 312? At the time of 
52. See 545 F.2d at 270 n.2; 407 F. Supp. at 1041-42 n.5. 
53. See note 47 and accompanying text supra. 
54. H.R. REP. NO. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A181, reprinted in [I9541 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4320. 
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the drafting of the House report, what is now section 316 of the 
Code was section 312 of the House bill. The Senate subsequently 
renumbered the sections." Reading the two reports together leads 
to the inescapable conclusion that after the Senate renumbered 
the sections, the Senate pulled the statement verbatim out of the 
House report, correctly changed the reference in the first sentence 
to section 316 because of the renumbering, but failed to make a 
similar correction in the second sentence.56 Accordingly, the refer- 
ence to section 312 in the second sentence of the Senate report 
should have been to section 316. This conclusion is certainly rea- 
sonable, since section 562 of the 1954 Code, the Code section that 
the statements are intended to explain, merely refers the reader 
to section 316 for the definition of "dividend." Moreover, section 
316, not section 312, defines the term "dividend." Of course, this 
conclusion destroys the government's argument that the refer- 
ence to section 312 was intended to show that the earnings and 
profits rules of section 312 of the 1954 Code should be used in 
determining the amount of the dividends paid deduction. 
B. Rule of 1939 Code Incorporated in Section 31 6 
The district court and the First Circuit in Fulman concluded 
that even if the reference to section 312 is changed to section 316, 
the second sentence of the statement (which states that the 
"requirements" of old sections 27(d), (e), (f), and (i) are con- 
tained in section 312) still clearly indicates that Congress in- 
tended to perpetuate the rule contained in old section 27(d)." 
This conclusion necessarily assumes that an error was made in 
drafting the Code, since the rule of section 27(d) is not "con- 
tained" in the 1954 Code; it also assumes that both the House 
and Senate reports are'in error for suggesting that section 27(d) 
is incorporated in the 1954 Code. Moreover, this conclusion fails 
55. As the Senate Report indicates, "[s]ection 316 sets forth the definition of a 
dividend for purposes of the subtitle. This definition corresponds generally . . . to section 
312(a) of the House bill." S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 251, reprinted in [I9541 
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4889. 
56. The Massachusetts district court and the First Circuit in Fulman both noted that 
this error was made in preparing the Senate Finance Committee report. 407 F. Supp. a t  
1041-42 n.5; 545 F.2d a t  270 n.2. 
57. 545 F.2d a t  270: "Although the language of this report is ambiguous in several 
respects and may not support the government's claim that it indicates that 8 312 is to 
govern such matters, this report certainly indicates that Congress did not contemplate the 
abrogation of the rule of old 8 27(d)." (footnote omitted). 
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to consider the possible significance of the word "requirements," 
which appears in the second sentence of the statement. 
As an alternative to the conclusion of the Fulman courts, one 
can reasonably argue that the term "requirements" in the second 
sentence of the statement suggests that the drafters of the reports 
merely intended that this sentence communicate to the reader 
that the functions or "requirements" previously satisfied by sec- 
tions 27(d), (e), (f), and (i) of the 1939 Code are now satisfied by 
section 316 of the 1954 Code. In other words, the second sentence 
of the statement was not intended to indicate that section 316 of 
the 1954 Code incorporates the exact rules of section 27 of the 
1939 Code, but rather that the term "dividend" as defined in 
section 316 of the 1954 Code eliminates the need for the old rules. 
A number of arguments can be made in support of such an inter- 
pretation. 
First, the proposed interpretation is completely consistent 
with and arguably buttressed by the first sentence of the state- 
ment. The first sentence informs the reader that the definition of 
dividends under section 316 determines what dividends are de- 
ductible under sections 561 and 562. According to the suggested 
interpretation, the second sentence merely amplifies the first by 
explaining that since the definition of dividend in section 316 
serves the same function as old section 27, it eliminates the need 
for the rules previously set forth in old section 27. Under such an 
interpretation, the second sentence logically follows the first. 
Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with section 562 of the 
1954 Code, which the statement in the reports is intended to 
explain, because section 562, like the first sentence of the state- 
ment, simply states that the dividends deductible are those divi- 
dends defined in section 316. 
Second, the proposed interpretation of the second sentence 
does not require the conclusion that an oversight was made in 
drafting the 1954 Code or in drafting the legislative reports. 
Of course, section 316 does not indicate the amount of a 
dividend when a corporation distributes property in kind to its 
shareholders. For this reason, it may be argued that the sentence 
is in error even under the suggested interpretation. As previously 
illustrated, however, the amount of the dividend can be readily 
determined if sections 301 and 316 are read togetheP and, in this 
connection, the same Senate and House reports that contain the 
58. See notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra. 
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statement in issue indicate by word and example that sections 
301 and 316 should be read together in determining the amount 
of a dividend when property is distributed in kind." Thus, it can 
be persuasively argued that the legislative reports in their total 
context suggest that the functions previously covered by section 
27(d) are now covered by sections 316 and 301 of the 1954 Code. 
If sections 301 and 316 are read together, the deduction equals the 
fair market value of property distributed to a noncorporate share- 
holder 
The legislative history provides an additional basis for sug- 
gesting that sections 301 and 316 should be read together in deter- 
mining the amount of the dividends paid deduction. The state- 
ment from the House and Senate reports indicates that, in addi- 
tion to the requirements of section 27(d) of the 1939 Code, the 
requirements of section 27(e), (f), and (i) are contained in section 
316 of the 1954 Code. An examination of these other subsections 
to section 27 of the 1939 Code reveals that sections 301 and 316 
of the 1954 Code, if read together, embrace all the situations 
referred to in these subsections of old section 27. 
Subsection (e) of old section 27 specified the amount of the 
dividend when a corporation distributed its own obligations, and 
subsection (f) specified the amount of the dividend when a corpo- 
ration distributed a taxable stock dividend!' Under the 1954 
59. The House Report to the 1954 Code states that when property is distributed in 
kind, "the extent to which such distribution would constitute a dividend under section 
301 and section 312(a) shall be made by reference to the fair market value of the property 
received by the shareholder and the earnings and profits of the corporation at the time of 
the distribution." H.R. Rm. NO. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A94, reprinted in 119541 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4232. The reference to section 312(a) in the House report 
is actually a reference to sectiop 316 of the 1954 Code for reasons previously noted. See 
note 55 and accompanying text supra. The House and the Senate reports each contain an 
example illustrating that the amount of the dividend is determined with reference to 4 
301 and 4 316. H.R. REP. NO. 1337,83d Cong. 2d Sess. A94, reprinted in [I9541 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4232; S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 248, reprinted in 
[I9541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4885. 
60. See note 40 and accompanying text supra. 
61. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, 4 27(e), (f), 53 Stat. 1: 
(e) DIVIDENDS IN OBLIGATIONS OF THE CORPORATION.-If a dividend is paid in 
obligations of the corporation, the amount with respect thereto which shall be 
used in computing the basic surtax credit shall be the face value of the obliga- 
tions or their fair market value at the time of the payment, whichever is the 
lower. . . . 
(f) TAXABLE STOCK DIVIDENDS.-I~ case of a stock dividend or stock right 
which is a taxable dividend in the hands of shareholders under section 115(f), 
the amount with respect thereto which shall be used in computing the basic 
surtax credit shall be the fair market value of the stock or the stock right a t  the 
time of the payment. 
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Code, a corporation's own obligations and taxable stock divi- 
dends are treated as property under section 301," and the general 
rules of section 301 and 316, read together, are used in determin- 
ing the amount of the dividend under such  circumstance^.^^ 
Moreover, the result obtained under sections 301 and 316 of the 
1954 Code is identical to the result obtained under old section 
27(f) .64 
Subsection (i) of old section 27 was the other subsection 
whose "requirements," according to the statement in the legisla- 
tive reports, are contained in the definition of dividends in section 
316 of the 1954 Code. Subsection (i) stated: 
(i) NONTAXABLE DISTRIBUTIONS-If any part of a distribution 
(including stock dividends and stock rights) is not a taxable 
dividend in the hands of such of the shareholders as are subject 
to taxation under this chapter for the period in which the distri- 
bution is made, such part shall not be included in computing 
the basic surtax 
The effect of this subsection was to prevent a corporation from 
receiving a dividends paid deduction (referred to as "credit" 
under the 1939 Code) on any part of a distribution that was not 
taxed to shareholders as a dividend. Since section 301 of the 1954 
Code explains the tax effect of a dividend on a shareholder, a 
similar result can be obtained under the 1954 Code only if sec- 
tions 316 and 301 are read together in determining the amount of 
the dividends paid deduction. Under regulation 1.562- 1, the man- 
date of subsection (i) is violated if the corporation distributes to 
a noncorporate shareholder property that  has depreciated in 
value, since the shareholder would report dividend income equal 
to the fair market value of the property under section 301, 
62. When dealing with a noncorporate distributee, it is universally conceded, al- 
though the Code itself is not explicit, that a distribution by a corporation of its own 
obligations is to be treated as a distribution of property under section 301(b)(l)(A). B. 
B~ITKER & J. Eusnc~, supra note 5, T[ 7.40. Likewise, taxable stock dividends, subject to 
the provisions of section 305(b), are treated as distributions of property to which section 
301 applies. For a detailed discussion of the history and intricacies of taxable stock divi- 
dends, see id. T[ 7.60-62. 
63. See id. T[T[ 7.40, .61(3), .62(l). 
64. Under 4 301 and 6 316, an individual shareholder reports dividend income equal 
to the fair market value of the corporate obligation or taxable stock distributed, assuming 
there are sufficient earnings and profits. An identical rule for taxable stock dividends was 
provided in 4 27(f) of the 1939 Code. Section 27(e) of the 1939 Code provided that, with 
respect to distributions of a corporation's own obligations, the amount distributed equaled 
the fair market value or face amount of the obligation, whichever was the lower. Note 61 
supra. 
65. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, 4 27(i), 53 Stat. 1. 
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whereas under the regulation the corporation would obtain a divi- 
dends paid deduction equal to the tax basis of the property? 
The net effect of this discussion is that the legislative history, 
like the Code, does not provide a definite, unambiguous answer 
to the question presented. Nevertheless, a few helpful conclusions 
can be drawn. It clearly appears that the reference to section 312 
in the statement in the Senate report should have been to section 
316. Also, the conclusion reached by all courts that have upheld 
the regulation that the legislative history "clearly manifests" 
Congress' intention to retain the rule contained in old section 
27(d) is incorrect. The legislative history does not "clearly" sup- 
port such a conclusion. Indeed, a strong argument can be made 
that the legislative history, when viewed in its total context, sug- 
gests that together section 301 and 316 of the 1954 Code were 
intended to and do resolve those situations previously resolved by 
section 27(d), (e), (f) and (i) of the 1939 Code, and that the 
dividends paid deduction should therefore be determined by ref- 
erence to sections 301 and 316. 
This section analyzes which method of computing the divi- 
dends paid deduction for distributions of property in kind best 
serves the purpose and objective of the accumulated earnings tax 
and the personal holding company tax. 
A. Objective of the Taxes 
The accumulated earnings tax can be traced to the Revenue 
Act of 1913." At that time, Congress recognized that shareholders 
of a corporation could avoid individual income taxes by allowing 
the corporation to accdmulate earnings. To prevent such abuse, 
the Revenue Act of 1913 provided that if any corporation was 
"formed or availed of'  for the purpose of avoiding the tax to its 
66. Neither the Fulman courts nor the Wetter courts considered subsections (e), (0, 
or (i) of § 27 of the 1939 Code, all of which are referred to in the same sentence of the 
legislative reports that mentions subsection 27(d). As the discussion in the text demon- 
strates, the function each of the subsections sewed under the 1939 Code is satisfied under 
the 1954 Code only if sections 301 and 316 are read together in computing the amount of 
the deduction for dividends paid. 
67. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(a)(2), 38 Stat. 114. For a good discussion of the 
history of the accumulated earnings tax, see 7 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION §§ 39.01, .04 (rev. ed. 1976). For a detailed legislative history of this tax, see 
JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 8 2 ~  CONG., 2D SESS., THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE 
SURPLUS ACCUMULATIONS (Comm. Print 1952). 
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shareholders by accumulating earnings, the shareholders would 
be taxed as if the earnings were distributed.18 The effect of this 
provision was to create a tax a t  the shareholder level equal to the 
corporation's annual earnings, whether or not these earnings were 
distributed. In 1921, Congress determined that the 1920 case of 
Eisner u. Macom bers9 created "considerable doubt" as to the con- 
stitutionality of taxing shareholders on income they never re- 
~eived.~O As a result, the accumulated earnings tax was changed 
by the Revenue Act of 1921,71 and Congress elected to accomplish 
its purpose by imposing the tax a t  the corporate level unless the 
shareholders consented to include their share of the annual corpo- 
rate earnings in their income.72 Although Congress changed the 
means of accomplishing its purpose in 1921, the objective of the 
tax has always been the same-"to force improper accumulations 
of each year's income out of the 'incorporated pocketbook' of 
business corporations and into the hands of stockholders where 
they will be taxable . . . ."73 This purpose is still recognized by 
68. The "formed or availed of' test has accompanied the accumulated earnings tax 
since its beginning in the Revenue Act of 1913. Under this test, whether a corporation was 
formed for the purpose of avoiding taxes by accumulating earnings and profits is immate- 
rial if the corporation was actually availed of for the purpose during the taxable year. In 
practice, the test is difficult to apply. For an in depth consideration, see B. B ~ ~ T K E R  & J. 
E u s n c ~ ,  supra note 5, fi 8.02 and 7 J. MERTENS, supra note 67, at 4 39.27. 
69. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). In Eisner, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not 
tax income to a shareholder of a corporation until it was actually "realized." Since a stock 
dividend, evidencing nothing more than the transfer of accumulated surplus to the capital 
account of a corporation, took nothing from the corporation's property and added nothing 
to that of the shareholder, no income was "realized" by the individual. 
70. H.R. REP. NO. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1921): 
Section 226: Section 220 of the existing law provides that if any corpora- 
tion is formed or availed of for the purpose of evading the surtax upon its 
stockholders through the medium of permitting its gains and profits to accumu- 
late instead of being divided, the stockholders shall be taxed in the same manner 
as partners. By reason of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the stock 
dividend case (Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S., 189), considerable doubt exists 
as to the constitutionality of the existing law. Section 226 of the bill therefore 
proposes to amend section 220 of the existing law so as to impose upon corpora- 
tions of the character above described a flat additional income tax of 25 percent 
of the net income; but, if the stockholders agree, they may be taxed upon their 
distributive shares in the net income of the corporation in the same manner as 
members of a partnership, such taxes to be in lieu of all income taxes upon the 
corporation. 
71. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 220, 42 Stat. 227. 
72. A corporation can still avoid the accumulated earnings tax and personal holding 
company tax by having its shareholders consent to include in their taxable income their 
share of the annual corporate earnings. I.R.C. 4 565; see note 7 supra; notes 78-79 and 
accompanying text infra. 
73. Harry M. Stevens, Inc. v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 436,437 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 
353 U.S. 909 (1957). 
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the Supreme 
The personal holding company tax was added in 1934 for the 
purpose of automatically imposing a substantial penalty tax upon 
those corporations that constitute "personal holding companies" 
and enable their shareholders to avoid paying taxes on earnings 
accumulated by the c~rporat ion.~~ Although applicable to a far 
smaller class of corporations than the accumulated earnings tax, 
the personal holding company tax is much easier to apply, since 
there is no need to prove that the corporation was "formed or 
availed of' for the purpose of avoiding the income tax on its 
shareholders. The House report to the Revenue Act of 1934 leaves 
no doubt that the objective of the personal holding company tax 
is the same as that of the accumulated earnings tax-to prevent 
shareholders from avoiding the individual tax by the use of 
"incorporated  pocketbook^."^^ The report indicates that the func- 
tion of the dividends paid deduction is to insure that the tax 
works "no real hardship upon any corporation except one which 
is being used to reduce surtaxes upon its  shareholder^."^^ 
The objective of both taxes focuses on the income taxable at 
the shareholder level. That the tax is directed at shareholder's 
income is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that Congress 
has specifically provided a means whereby the accumulated earn- 
ings tax and the personal holding company tax can be avoided if 
the shareholders consent to report as dividend income the annual 
corporate earnings.78 If such a consent is obtained, the corporation 
74. Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1975): 
Without some method to force the distribution of unneeded corporate earnings, 
a controlling shareholder would be able to postpone the full impact of the in- 
come taxes on his share of the corporate earnings in excess of its needs . . . . 
In order to foreclose th:s possibility of using the corporation as a means of 
avoiding the income tax on dividends to the shareholders, every Revenue Act 
since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 has imposed a tax upon 
unnecessary accumulations of corporate earnings effected for the purpose of 
insulating shareholders. 
(citations omitted) (noted at 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 812). 
75. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 216, ch. 277, § 351,48 Stat. 680. For a discussion 
of the legislative history of this Act, see Noteman v. Welch, 26 F. Supp. 437, 441 (D. 
Mass.), aff'd, 108 F.2d 206 (1st Cir. 1939). 
76. H.R. REP. NO. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934): 
Perhaps the most prevalent form of tax avoidance practiced by individuals 
with large incomes is the scheme of the "incorporated pocketbook." That is, an 
individual forms a corporation and exchanges for its stock his personal holdings 
in stock . . . . By this means the income from the property pays corporation 
tax, but no surtax is paid by the individual if the income is not distributed. 
77. Id. a t  12. 
78. The dividends paid deduction of I.R.C. 9 561 includes the sum of the consent 
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gets a deduction for dividends paid under section 565 without 
having to sell, exchange, or distribute any assets. The justifica- 
tion for the provision is that there is no need for a corporation to 
alter its affairs or actually distribute assets, since the common 
objective of the taxes will be satisfied as long as the government 
is not deprived of "the revenue which would flow from the receipt 
of dividends by the  shareholder^."^^ 
In order to determine whether the dividends paid deduction 
should equal the adjusted tax basis of property distributed in 
kind, as required by the regulation, or the amount of dividend 
income taxable to the shareholders, a distinction must be drawn 
between the common objective of the accumulated earnings and 
personal holding company taxes and the means used to accom- 
plish that objective. As indicated above, the objective of the taxes 
is to prevent use of the corporation as a means of avoiding the 
income tax on dividends to shareholders. This objective focuses 
upon the dividend income reportable by the shareholders. In the 
case of both the accumulated earnings tax and the personal hold- 
ing company tax, the means used by the Code to accomplish this 
objective is to provide that a substantial additional tax will be 
imposed upon the adjusted taxable income of the corporation 
unless the corporation secures a deduction for dividends paid 
equal to its adjusted taxable income." As previously noted, this 
method of taxation was drafted following Eisner v. Macomber 
because Congress foresaw possible constitutional problems in tax- 
ing a shareholder directly on income he may never receive." Be- 
cause the Code accomplishes the common objective-tax at the 
dividends for the taxable years. Thus, if the shareholder consents to report income as 
though a dividend had been received, the corporation can avoid the penalty taxes without 
actually distributing property or money. 
79. The consent dividend procedure in I.R.C. Q 565 can be traced to the Revenue Act 
of 1938, ch. 289, Q 28, 52 Stat. 447. The purpose for the provision was aptly described in 
the House Report to the Revenue Act of 1938 as follows: 
One of the principal objections which has been urged to any form of corpora- 
tion tax measured by undistributed profits has always been that many corpora- 
tions, for a variety of reasons, find it difficult, if not impossible, in certain 
situations to declare dividends in cash or scrip or to distribute taxable stock 
dividends. Section 28 of the bill is intended to provide a method whereby such 
a corporation, with the cooperation of its shareholders, may obtain the tax 
benefits incident to actual distribution without violation of any contractual 
commitment or any rule of law which might prevent it, in whole or in part, from 
distributing its earnings and without depriving the Government of the revenue 
which would flow from the receipt of dividends by the shareholders. 
H.R. REP. NO. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 24 (1938) (emphasis added). 
80. See note 6 and accompanying text supra. 
81. See notes 69-72 and accompanying text supra. 
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shareholder level-by the means of threatening a substantial 
additional corporate tax on realized earnings for the given year, 
it is possible to confuse the means with the objective, by conclud- 
ing that the objective of the taxes is to impose an additional tax 
a t  the corporate level on undistributed realized earnings. The 
effect of such a mistake is to lose sight of the income reportable 
by the shareholders, thereby frustrating the real objective. As 
explained below, the First Circuit in Fulman made this very mis- 
take and, as a result, incorrectly analyzed the issue presented. 
B. The First Circuit's Error 
The First Circuit in the Fulman case was the only court that 
examined the objective of the personal holding company tax in 
resolving the issue. That court gave two illustrations of how there 
would be "irrational results" if the dividends paid deduction were 
to equal the amount of the dividend income taxable to the share- 
holders under sections 301 and 316. Both illustrations demon- 
strate that the court misperceived the objective of the personal 
holding company tax. 
The court first explained that the purpose of the personal 
holding company tax could be undermined if the deduction were 
to equal the dividend taxable to the shareholders because, with 
such a rule, a corporation that distributes appreciated property 
could avoid the tax and, a t  the same time, could "continue to 
accumulate the income it had realized on its investments during 
the relevant tax year-without being under any compulsion to 
distribute such earnings."" According to the court, the "net effect 
would be that the corporation, and hence the shareholders, could 
succeed in shielding passive investment income from the opera- 
tions of the personal holding company tax."" 
The court's argument focuses on the corporation and incor- 
rectly assumes that the objective of the tax is to impose an addi- 
tional tax at the corporate level on undistributed realized income 
for the year. As explained above, the real objective of the tax is 
to create a tax a t  the shareholder level equal to the corporation's 
earnings for the year. This objective, by definition, is satisfied 
only if the corporation's deduction for dividends paid is equal to 
the dividends taxable to its shareholders. Accordingly, the objec- 
tive is satisfied, not frustrated, when individual shareholders, 
82. 545 F.2d at 272. 
83. Id. 
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pursuant to sections 301 and 316, report dividends equal to the 
fair market value of the property distributed in kind and the 
corporation gets a deduction in the same amount for dividends 
paid. The fact that the fair market value of the property is greater 
or less than its adjusted tax basis is not relevant in determining 
whether the basic objective has been satisfied. 
The court's second illustration of how there would be 
"irrational results" if the deduction equaled the dividends tax- 
able to the shareholders under sections 301 and 316 can best be 
explained by an example. Suppose personal holding companies A 
and B each have $50,000 of undistributed personal holding com- 
pany income before the dividends paid deduction and each have 
invested $10,000 in marketable securities. Suppose further that 
the securities in which Company A invested have appreciated in 
value to $50,000, whereas the securities in which Company B 
invested have appreciated in value to only $20,000. If both com- 
panies distribute their securities as dividends, the shareholders of 
Company A would have to report a dividend of $50,000, the fair 
market value of the stock, and the shareholders of Company B 
would have to report a dividend of $20,000.84 If the dividends paid 
deduction equals the amount of dividends reportable by the 
shareholders, Company A would have a large enough deduction 
for dividends paid to avoid the personal holding company tax, but 
Company B would have to distribute additional property or se- 
cure the necessary consent for its shareholders to report an addi- 
tional $30,000 of dividend income. According to the First Circuit 
in Fulman, such a result would be irrational because the com- 
panies would have "completely different tax liabilities after 
distributing assets representing the same level of corporate 
investment ."85 
The court gives no explanation of how the purpose and objec- 
tive of the tax square with its argument that companies with 
equal earnings should be treated equally if they distribute assets 
representing the same level of corporate inve~tment .~~  The argu- 
-- - 
84. This example and subsequent examples assume that the distribution is made to 
an individual rather than to a corporate distributee. 
85. 545 F.2d at 273. 
86. Id: 
The disparate treatment would not arise from m y  differences in their tax situa- 
tion during the tax year in question, but from the fact that the assets which they 
had distributed had appreciated at different rates during the period prior to that 
tax year. 
Since we think the regulation in question is entirely consistent with the 
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ment completely ignores the amount of dividends taxable to the 
shareholders of the respective companies. The objective of the tax 
is to create a tax at the shareholder level equal to the corpora- 
tion's annual earnings. This objective will be served if the only 
way each company can avoid the tax is by having its shareholders 
report dividend income of $50,000 under sections 301 and 316. 
Therefore, there is nothing irrational in allowing Company A to 
avoid the tax without any additional distributions and specifying 
that Company B can avoid the tax only if its shareholders either 
consent to report an additional $30,000 as dividend income or 
receive additional property requiring them to report an additional 
$30,000 of dividend income. The purpose of the tax is not to force 
Company A to distribute its property but only to assure that the 
shareholders of A and B each report income equal to $50,000, the 
amount of undistributed personal holding company income. 
C. The Section 301 Alternative Best Serves 
the Objective of the Taxes 
If the dividends paid deduction is measured by any standard 
other than the rules set forth in sections 301 and 316, then when- 
ever a corporation distributes property in kind as a dividend there 
will inevitably be a difference between the amount of dividend 
income taxable to the shareholders and the deduction given to the 
corporation for having distributed the dividend. This difference 
generally will create results inconsistent with the basic objective 
of the taxes. 
Regulation 1.562-1, which provides that the dividends paid 
deduction equals the adjusted tax basis of the property distrib- 
uted, aptly illustrates the point. Suppose personal holding Com- 
pany C, having $50,000 of undistributed personal holding com- 
pany income, had invested in two marketable securities. Suppose 
the first marketable security cost $50,000 and had declined in 
value to $10,000 and that the second security had cost $10,000 
and had appreciated in value to $50,000. If Company C distrib- 
utes the first security, its shareholders would have to report divi- 
dend income of only $10,000 under sections 301 and 316. Yet, 
under regulation 1.562-1, Company C would be entitled to a de- 
duction for dividends paid of $50,000, its adjusted tax basis in the 
property and, therefore, could avoid the personal holding com- 
objectives and terms of the revenue act, we hold that the district court was 
correct in sustaining the validity of this regulation . . . . 
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pany tax without having to make any further distributions. The 
net effect under the regulation is that the company could avoid 
the personal holding company tax by requiring that its sharehold- 
ers only report $10,000 of the $50,000 actually earned by the com- 
pany during the year. The result is to encourage companies to 
frustrate the basic objective of the taxes by picking and choosing 
for distribution those securities in their portfolios that have de- 
clined the most in value. 
A similar unreasonable result is obtained if regulation 1.562- 
1 is applied and Company C distributes the securities that have 
appreciated in value. The shareholders would report a dividend 
under sections 301 and 316 equal to $50,000, the fair market value 
of the property distributed, but the corporation would only re- 
ceive a deduction for dividends paid equal to $10,000 under the 
regulation. The objective of the tax is satisfied by this distribu- 
tion because the shareholders would report dividend income 
equal to the company's personal holding company income for the 
year. Nevertheless, under the regulation, Company C would have 
to distribute an additional $40,000 to its shareholders in order to 
avoid the tax. If the corporation has sufficient earnings and prof- 
its, the effect of such an additional distribution will be that the 
dividends taxable to the shareholders would exceed the com- 
pany's personal holding company earnings for the year by 
$40,000.87 If the company had not accumulated earnings and prof- 
its, a likely result for a personal holding company," the net effect 
would be even more absurd since the additional distribution 
would be treated as a nontaxable return of capital to the share- 
holders under sections 301 and 316." Nothing suggests that any 
87. This would follow from the fact that the shareholders have already reported 
income to the extent of personal holding company earnings on the original distribution of 
property with a fair market value of $50,000. The incongruity of this result with the 
objective of the personal holding company tax is compounded where the company is forced 
to distribute additional appreciated property, the shareholder being forced to report as 
dividend income perhaps twice or three times more than the amount of personal holding 
company earnings of the corporation. For example, if the company distributes additional 
stocks with a basis of $40,000 and a fair market value of $100,000, the company will avoid 
the penalty tax by having distributed property with a cumulative basis equal to the 
earnings for the year. The shareholder, however, must report as income an amount equal 
to three times the corporation's earnings, since the fair market value of the dividends 
received is $150,000. 
88. Personal holding companies generally do not accumulate significant earnings and 
profits because they must distribute all of their personal holding company income an- 
nually in order to avoid the 70% penalty tax. 
89. A noncorporate distributee is taxed only to the extent that a distribution is made 
from the corporation's earnings and profits. I.R.C. 0 0 3Ol(b) (l)(A), 301(c), 316. If there 
are no earnings and profits, the distribution is treated as a return of capital and works to 
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purpose or objective of the accumulated earnings tax or the per- 
sonal holding company tax would be served by requiring a com- 
pany to distribute nontaxable returns of capital or dividends in 
excess of the current year's earnings. 
The First Circuit in Fulman thought it would be an 
6 6 anomaly"g0 to value the dividends paid deduction under section 
301, since the amount of the deduction for a dividend in kind 
would then vary, depending upon whether or not the shareholder 
was a corporati~n.~' The First Circuit has clearly misperceived 
the objective of the accumulated earnings and personal holding 
company taxes. The fact that Congress had a sound reason for 
treating corporate and noncorporate shareholders differently 
when property is distributed in kindg2 does not in any way alter 
the fact that the purpose of the taxes-to create dividend income 
a t  the shareholder level-can only be satisfied if the dividends 
paid deduction equals the amount of dividend income taxable by 
the shareholders, whatever that amount might be under the 
Code. Indeed, the fact that Congress has set forth in section 301 
different rules for different types of shareholders when property 
is distributed in kind demonstrates that no single rule should be 
used for determining the dividends paid deduction and confirms 
the importance of referring to sections 301 and 316 in determining 
the amount of the deduction. 
The common objective of the accumulated earnings tax and 
the personal holding company tax will be served best if the deduc- 
tion for dividends paid equals the dividend income taxable to the 
reduce the shareholder's basis in the corporation's stock which he holds. I.R.C. 6 301(c)(2). 
If the return of capital exceeds the shareholder's basis in his stock, the excess is treated 
as gain recognized on the sale or exchange of property and is subject to capital gains 
treatment. I.R.C. $9 301(c)(3)(A), 1221, 1222. 
90. 545 F.2d at 272. The court gave no reason why it should be considered an anomaly 
that the amount of the dividends paid deduction would depend upon the characterization 
of the recipient of the dividend. 
91. See note 40 and accompanying text supra. 
92. The dr,afters of the 1954 Code specifically designed section 301 to insure that when 
property is distributed in kind, the dividend income taxable to a corporate shareholder 
and the corporate shareholder's tax basis in the property distributed would not exceed the 
tax basis of the property in the hands of the distributing corporation. This provision was 
necessary because 6 243 of the 1954 Code gives corporate shareholders an 85% deduction 
for dividends received from a domestic corporation. Thus, without such a provision, a 
corporate shareholder could get a stepped up basis in the property distributed by paying 
tax on only 15% of the amount of the unrealized appreciation. See H.R. REP. NO. 1337, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A71, reprinted in [I9541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4208. 
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shareholders when property is distributed in kind. Although am- 
biguous, the relevant Code sections and the legislative history in 
its full context appear to be consistent with and arguably suppor- 
tive of such a conclusion. Whereas the Sixth Circuit in Wetter 
ultimately reached the correct conclusion, it erred in reasoning 
that the Code was sufficiently unambiguous to warrant applica- 
tion of the plain meaning rule of statutory construction. The First 
Circuit in Fulman reached the wrong conclusion by reading too 
narrowly one sentence in the legislative history and misperceiving 
the real objective of the personal holding company tax. 
As the Fulman court recognized, Treasury regulations are 
entitled to deference when reviewed by a court and should be 
upheld unless they are "unreasonable and plainly inconsistent" 
with the revenue  statute^.'^ Since regulation 1.562-1 does not 
focus on the common objective of the accumulated earnings tax 
and the personal holding company tax, but actually provides a 
means whereby corporations and shareholders can frustrate the 
objective," a court could certainly conclude that the regulation 
is unreasonable and inconsistent with the statutory scheme. If the 
courts are unwilling to invalidate the regulation, however, then 
the regulation should be changed or, if necessary, section 562 of 
the Code should be amended to remove any ambiguity by ex- 
pressly providing that when property is distributed in kind, the 
deduction for dividends paid will equal the amount of dividend 
income taxable to the shareholders under sections 301 and 316 of 
the Code. 
93. See note 17 and accompanying text supra. 
94. See notes 86-89 and accompanying text supra. 
